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E-Sign Versus State Electronic Signature Laws: The Electronic
Statutory Battleground

I. INTRODUCTION
The Electronic Signatures in Global and National
Commerce Act (E-Sign)' was adopted by Congress on June 16,
2000, and signed by President Clinton on June 30, 2000.2 On its
effective date, October 1, 2000, the Act created a standard across
the United States for legal recognition of electronic signatures.3
Despite the availability of the Uniform Electronic Transactions
Act (UETA) and its adoption in many states,4 Congress adopted
E-Sign because of dual concerns about the continued adoption of
divergent state laws governing electronic signatures and records
and uncertainty about the time it would take to enact UETA in all
of the states."
This Note will briefly examine electronic signatures6 and
the history of traditional signature requirements.7 The Note will
then present overviews of E-Sign and UETA.9 Next, the Note will
focus on the impact of E-Sign on the electronic signature and
record laws in the representative state schemes of North

1. Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act of 2000 (ESign), Pub. L. No. 106-229, 114 Stat. 464 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001-7031).

See also infra notes 44-82 and accompanying text.
2. Carol A. Kunze, What Happened to UETA in Congress, at http://www.

uetaonline.com/hapcong.html (last modified July 9, 2000) (created for UETA
Online).
3. Id. E-Sign creates a uniform standard by preempting inconsistent state laws
with a test outlined in section 102. See infra notes 64-82 and accompanying text. For
a definition of "electronic signatures" see infra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
4. UNIFORM ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT (UETA) (1999). See infra text
accompanying notes 83-98.
5. Robert A. Wittie & Jane K. Winn, Electronic Records and Signatures under
the FederalE-SIGN Legislationand the UETA, 56 Bus. LAW. 293, 296 (2000).
6. See infra Part II.A-B.
7. See infra Part III.A-B.
8. See infra Part IV.A-C.
9. See infra Part V.A-B.
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Carolina," California," and New York." Finally, the Note will
discuss E-Sign's general impact in the near future. 3
II. ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES

A.

Definition

In general terms, an electronic signature is any "electronic
sound, symbol, or process attached to or logically associated with a
record and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign
the record." 4 This definition is extremely broad and is highly
inclusive of different technologies.'"
B.

Technology Issues

One specific type of electronic technology, a digital
signature, is an encrypted electronic signature. 6 Digital signature
technologies normally incorporate public key infrastructure
10. See infra Part V.C.1-2.
11. See infra Part V.D.1-2.
12. See infra Part VI.A-C.
13. See infra Parts VII., VIII.
14. UETA § 2(8) (1999). The term "electronic signature" means "an electronic
sound, symbol, or process, attached to or logically associated with a contract or other
record and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record."
Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act of 2000 (E-Sign) §
106(5), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7006(5) (West Supp. 2000). The term "signed" means "any
symbol executed or adopted by a party with present intention to authenticate a
writing." U.C.C. § 1-201(39) (1977).
15. Tom Melling, Digital Signatures vs. Electronic Signatures, E-BUSINESS
ADVISOR, Apr. 1, 2000, LEXIS, News Library, EBUSAD File. The types of possible
electronic signatures are limited only by the imagination of the parties contracting,
possibly including such methods as a simple typed symbol, a digitalized handwritten
signature, an electronic sound, clickwraps (such as a button stating "I accept" that
can be clicked on), pass codes, voice prints, retinal scans, fingerprints, or any
combination of these methods. Id.
16. William A. Tanenbaum, Paperless Contracts Are Here: State Electronic
Signatures and RecordsAct, EnablingRegulationsHave Taken Effect, N.Y. L.J., Apr.
24, 2000, at S10. Encryption technology is the use of mathematical algorithms in
order to encrypt, or disguise, the text or original form of the data to be transferred so
that it cannot be accessed without either the knowledge of what process was used to
encrypt the data or the appropriate decryption key. Id. The algorithms are often
very complex, resulting in strong security, making the encryption very difficult to
undo without the appropriate decryption key. Id.
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technology (PKI).' This technology enables the parties to a
transaction to verify that the sent document has not been altered
and has been signed by the party purporting to sign the
document.18
For institutions, such as banks, seeking to deploy digital

17. Id. Each party involved in a transaction using PKI technology has both a
public key and a private key. Id. The public key is published in a directory available
to third parties, while the private key is known solely by the holder of that key. Id.
In order to make the process work, the party sending the document would use its
private key to sign and encrypt the document. Id. The encrypted document would
then be sent to the recipient party who would use the public key of the sender to
decrypt the document. Id. To ensure that the individual's signature on the electronic
document is actually that of the individual who sent the document, third parties are
often used for verification purposes. Id. These third parties, usually known as
certification authorities, generate the keys used by companies or individuals;
therefore, they are able to verify that the key used is actually that of the correct
party. Id. This authorization process prevents the use of fake keys to impersonate
another individual or entity. Id.
18. Melling, supra note 15. While this method adds security, the use of a
certificate authority, normally an integral part of the digital signature process, adds
transactional costs. Id.
If a bank decides to incorporate digital signature
technologies, it must also decide whether or not to operate its own certificate
authority for its customers. BANK TECH. GROUP, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.,
BULLETIN ON DIGITAL SIGNATURES, at http:lwww.fdic.gov/regulations/informationl
fils/banktechbulletin.html (Sept. 30, 2000). Zions Bancorp, Bank of America Corp.,
and Wachovia Corp. are some of the large banks have already begun acting as
certificate authorities in some capacity. They're Bullish on Digital Certificates,AM.
BANKER, Dec. 27, 2000, at 1. A Wells Fargo & Co. pilot program is allowing a trial
group of commercial customers to use digital certificates to authenticate certain types
of transactions and plans to extend the program to all commercial customers within a
year. Carol Power, E-Sign Law Gives Equality to E-Signatures, AM. BANKER, Oct.
12, 2000, at 14A. Financial institutions are being looked to as the best potential
candidates for serving as certificate authorities because they already possess the trust
required to serve such a role. Lavonne Kuykendall, Consumer Use of Digital
Signatures Still Far Off, AM. BANKER, Nov. 21, 2000, at 1. The advantages of
certificate authority operation are that it establishes bank customer identity,
increases potential customer retention, provides for community outreach, and the
technology is relatively inexpensive to implement. BANK TECH. GROUP, supra. The
disadvantages are that the standards are still changing, operation would cause
additional expenses due to a need for more hardware facilities and a diligent security
structure, it would require more technical expertise, and potential new liabilities for
the bank are created. Id. However, incorporation of digital signature technology
could save money for banks that in the long run would eclipse the costs of
implementing and operating the technology by allowing for electronic archival
storage instead of huge file cabinets to store paper documents. Lavonne Kuykendall,
Embrace E-Signatures Quickly, Banks Urged, AM. BANKER, Dec. 12, 2000, at 13.
Secure electronic storage vaults in which customers could store important electronic
documents could be another source of revenue for banks. Id. See Carrie O'Brien,
Note, E-Sign: Will the New Law IncreaseInternet Security Allowing Online Mortgage
Lending to Become Routine?, 5 N.C. BANKING INST., 525 (2001).
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signature technology, several considerations must be weighed. 9
The institution must ensure that the technology is compatible with
the institution's other systems." In addition, the different types of

technologies available vary in the amount of security they provide
to users.21 The weakest security provided is through simple
methods such as passwords, personal identification numbers, or
other "shared secret" methods.'
Biometric signatures,
incorporating physical attributes of the signor into the signature,
offer more security than the "shared secret" methods.' The most
secure individual method is a digital signature. ' A combination of
19. BANK TEcH. GROUP, supra note 18.
20. Id. Institutions should be sure to conduct a thorough due diligence on any
vendor of digital technologies the institution may engage. Id.
21. Melling, supra note 15. The United States Office of Management and Budget
analyzed this issue in regards to federal agencies ranking the security levels of the
technologies as set out above. Id.
22. Id. "Shared secrets" methods involve a system whereby both parties are the
only two privy to the "secret." Id. Because there is no other safeguard of the secret
such as encryption or the like, its success relies on guarding the secrecy of the method
between the parties to the transaction. Id. The use of such measures, though
inexpensive to implement, also seems self-defeating in the pre-contract stage since by
their nature they normally require a pre-existing contract between the parties using
them. See id.
23. Id. Biometric technologies-retinal scans, voice prints, and fingerprintsrequire the use of a special peripheral device for each computer, such as a retinal
scanner, adding another complication and making such signature technologies less
practical for large scale implementation. Id. See generally, Robyn Moo-Young,
Note, "Eyeing" The Future: Surviving The Criticisms Of Biometric Authentication, 5
N.C. Banking Inst, 5 N.C. BANKING INST., 421 (2001) (further discussing biometric
technologies).
24. Melling, supra note 15. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text. The
U.S. Department of Defense has chosen digital signatures as the standard for all of its
business affairs. Melling, supra note 15. Foreign countries such as Germany,
Argentina, Italy, and Malaysia have adopted legislation authorizing digital signatures
as the only accepted method of electronic signatures. STEWART BAKER & MATTHEW
YEO, THE INTERNET LAW AND POLICY FORUM, SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL
ELECTRONIC AND DIGITAL SIGNATURE INITIATIVES, at http://www.ilpf.org/digsig/
survey.htm (last modified Sept. 24, 1999). However the United States wishes to
encourage a technology-neutral legal standard in the world, feeling it would be the
best legal framework for global electronic commerce. President's Remarks on
Signing the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act in
Philadelphia, 36 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1561 (June 30, 2000). In order to
encourage technology-neutral standards internationally, negotiations with the
European Union are a top priority of the E-Sign legislation given the trend in Europe
towards legal recognition of digital signatures only. 146 CONG. REC. H4356-7 (daily
ed. June 14, 2000) (statement by Rep. Bliley). E-Sign directs the Secretary of
Commerce to examine foreign laws that affect electronic signatures and records and
to work to gain acceptance of electronic records and signatures internationally. 146
CONG. REC. H-4360 (daily ed. June 14,2000) (statement by Rep. Tauzin).
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digital signatures with biometric technologies would likely provide
the most security.'
. 11. HISTORICAL Vmw

A.

Statute of Frauds

The major obstacle to the widespread recognition of
electronic commerce, signatures, and records has been the Statute
of Frauds.' The Statute of Frauds provides that certain types of
contracts, such as a contract for the sale of goods for $500 or more,
must be in writing and signed by the party to be charged in order
to be enforceable against that party.' In every jurisdiction where
the Statute of Frauds remains in force, the question of how to
reconcile electronic records with it must be answered.? Three
proposals have been advanced: 1) leave the decision to the
judiciary; 2) repeal the Statute of Frauds; or 3) amend the
25. See Melling, supra note 15. The added complications and cost implications
for implementing a combination of signature technologies would probably be a
deterrent for many users from attempting such an approach. See id.
26. R. 1. Robertson, Jr., Electronic Commerce on the Internet and the Statute of
Frauds, 49 S.C. L. Rnv. 787, 789 (1998). In 1677, England enacted the original
Statute of Frauds. Shawn Pompian, Note, Is the Statute of Frauds Ready for
Electronic Contracting?, 85 VA. L. Rnv. 1447, 1453 (1999). Parliament enacted the
statute to ensure that contracts would not be enforced by the courts based solely on
false testimony procured by plaintiffs. Id. Though repealed in England in 1953, here
in the United States the Statute of Frauds is the law in one form or another in nearly
all United States jurisdictions. Id. at 1448.
27. Robertson, supra note 26, at 789; U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (1977). The Statute of
Frauds in the U.C.C., a standard form of the statute in the United States, provides
that "a contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable
by way of action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a
contract for sale has been made between the parties and signed by the party against
whom enforcement is sought.. ." U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (1977). The statute does not call
for the enforcement of all contracts signed and in writing; it simply creates a
condition that must be satisfied before the courts will even consider enforcing a
contract. Pompian, supra note 26, at 1453. Two justifications are normally given for
the Statute of Frauds: 1) efficiency, since use of the courts will be reduced if no
signed writing can be produced, and 2) protectionism, setting up barriers to
exploitation of the legal system by unscrupulous parties (although a critique of the
Statute has been that it encourages promisors to hide behind its protection when
most useful). Id. at 1452-60. For further discussion of the history of the Statute of
Frauds see generally Pompian, supra note 26.
28. See generally Pompian, supra note 26.
29. Robertson, supra note 26, at 790. There is a background of case law on non-
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Statute of Frauds to recognize electronic signatures and records as
legally effective.31 If determination of the validity of electronic
signatures were left to the judiciary, the process of determination
would develop on a case-by-case basis, taking a substantial period
of time to create a body of law on the subject. The Statute of
Frauds is also unlikely to be repealed in the United States any time
in the near future.3 Thus, amending the Statute of Frauds to
include electronic records and signatures is the most feasible
option.'

traditional writings which some argue support the notion that no revision of the laws
is necessary for electronic signatures and records to be legally effective. See id. at
798-807. See, e.g., Howley v. Whipple, 48 N.H. 487 (1869) (holding that a telegraph
was a writing under the Statute of Frauds); Yaggy v. B.V.D. Co., 173 S.E.2d 496
(N.C. App. 1970) (holding typewritten name at end of telegram satisfied the
signature requirement of the Statute of Frauds as long as the affixer intended to place
his name upon the telegram for identity); Parma Tile Mosaic & Marble Co. v. Estate
of Short, 663 N.E.2d 633 (N.Y. 1996) (implying that while the particular fax in
question did not meet the signed writing requirement of the Statute of Frauds, a fax
could satisfy the requirement if the necessary intent to sign was present); Ellis
Canning Co. v. Bernstein, 348 F. Supp. 1212 (D. Colo. 1972) (noting that a tape
recorded agreement meets the requirements of the Statute of Frauds). But see, e.g.,
Pike Indust. v. Middlebury Assoc., 398 A.2d 280 (Vt. 1979) (holding that a telegraph
does not meet signature requirement of the Statute of Frauds); Department of
Transp. v. Norris, 474 S.E.2d 216 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996), rev'd sub nom. Norris v.
Georgia Dep't of Transp., 486 S.E.2d 826 (Ga. 1997) (holding that a fax does not
fulfill the requirement that a notice be given in writing); Sonders v. Roosevelt, 476
N.Y.S.2d 331 (App. Div. 1984), affd mem., 487 N.Y.S.2d 551 (1985) (holding
recorded telephone conversation did not satisfy the writing requirement of the
Statute of Frauds); Swink & Co. v. Carroll McEntee & McGinley, Inc., 584 S.W.2d
393 (Ark. 1979) (holding that a tape recording does not meet the signature
requirement of the Statute of Frauds).
30. Robertson, supra note 26, at 809.
31. Id. at 815.
32. Id. at 809. Such a process would not produce results quickly enough to
resolve the uncertainty surrounding the issue given the pressing need for certainty.
Id.
33. Id. There are a couple of reasons why the Statute of Frauds will not be
repealed: 1) the U.C.C. drafting process has reaffirmed the necessity for some form
of the Statute of Frauds in both contracts for the Sale of Goods and especially in
contracts dealing with information licensing (the U.C.C. drafting committee had been
long opposed to the Statute of Frauds, but this sudden reversal removed one of the
stronger proponents of the statute's repeal); and 2) while setting up exceptions to the
Statute of Frauds, no individual state has repealed the statute in its entirety. Id. at
809-10 (emphasis added).
34. See id. See also supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing the Statute
of Frauds). Indeed, this has been the approach generally taken in the United States.
See infra notes 35-43.
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Approaches to Amending the Law

Two schools of thought originally surrounded the
movement for law reform in regard to electronic commerce and
communication.35 The first school focused on law revision.36 The
second school focused on technology implementation.37 The two
schools brought significantly different approaches to the question
of what legal effect should be given to uses of electronic methods
to sign or authenticate electronic records.33
In 1995, Utah became the first state to take an affirmative
stance on the issue, passing a statute granting legal recognition to
digital signatures. The technology-based approach Utah chose
promotes a highly regulatory and prescriptive standard granting
legal enforceability only to digital signatures.'
In contrast,
legislation enacted by California4' took the other approach,
adopting a technology-neutral law, leaving technology decisions to
the parties in the market.42 In an endeavor to prevent further
35. Amelia H. Boss, The Internet and the Law: Searchingfor Security in the Law
of Economic Commerce, 23 NOVA L. R~v. 583, 596 (1999).
36. Id. The law revisionist school focused on existent legal structures and
principles in an attempt to apply them to and justify the legal recognition of
transactions entered into electronically. Id. Most of the changes that took place
under this view were simply general substantive revisions of commercial law to
accommodate electronic commerce. Id. at 597. The goals of this movement have
been to remain technology neutral, to remove barriers to electronic commerce, and
to treat electronic records the same as paper records. Id. at 601. This school leaves
technology decisions up to the market to determine. Id.
37. Id. at 597. The technology movement focused on particular technologies and
their implementation. Id. The underlying ideology of the technology movement is
that the specific technology (i.e. digital signatures) offers substantial benefits to
electronic commerce and therefore legislation should be tailored to secure those
benefits by codifying them into law. Id. at 601.
38. Id. at 602.
39. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-3-101 to -602 (1996); Boss, supra note 35, at 600.
40. Boss, supra note 35, at 602. Despite the Utah law, "technology specific"
legislation has not taken off in the United States. Id. For a discussion of the Illinois
Electronic Commerce Security Act compare Martin I. Behn, The Illinois Electronic
Commerce Security Act: Too Much Too Soon or Too Little Too Late?, 24 S. ILL. U. L.
J. 201 (2000), with R. J. Robertson, Jr., The Illinois Electronic Commerce Security
Act: A Response to MartinBehn, 24 S. ILL. U. L. J. 473 (2000).
41. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1633.1-1633.17 (West 2000). See also infra notes 153-207
and accompanying text.
42. Boss, supra note 35, at 603. This approach has been the approach gathering
the most support in the United States. Id. See, e.g., infra notes 44-201 and
accompanying text.
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divergence of the law governing electronic signature and records
that would result in impedance of interstate electronic commerce,
the drafting processes for both UETA and E-Sign began."
IV. E-SIGN

A.

GeneralProvisions

The major effect of E-Sign is that "with respect to any
transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce-a
signature, contract, or other record relating to a transaction will
not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because
it is in electronic form."" This provision has two limiting factors:
1) it only affects records or signatures relating to transactions,4"
and 2) it applies only to those "transactions in or affecting
interstate or foreign commerce."' In addition, E-Sign prohibits
the use of an electronic record if the record cannot be retained and

43. See supra notes 26-42 and accompanying text.
44. Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (E-Sign) of
2000 §101(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7001(a) (West Supp. 2000). The statute does not affect
any law other than the requirement that a record be written, signed, or in other nonelectronic form. Id. § 101(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7001(b).
45. Id. § 101(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7001(a). "The term 'transaction' means an action
or set of actions relating to the conduct of business, consumer, or commercial affairs
between two or more persons ...

."

Id. § 106(13), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7006(13).

It is

unclear whether charitable, religious, or non-profit matters will be considered
"transactions" under this limited definition. Letter from Edward C. Winslow III,
Attorney, Brooks, Pierce,McLendon, Humphrey, & Leonard,LLP, and Matthew G.
Bibbens, to Paul H. Stock, Executive Vice President and Counsel, N.C. Bankers
Association 6 (July 3, 2000) (on file with the N.C. BANKING INST.) [hereinafter July
Winslow Letter]. "Governmental" affairs were intentionally excluded from this
definition; therefore, records generated for governmental purposes only are not
subject to E-Sign. 146 CONG. REc. S5221 (daily ed. June 15,2000) (statement by Sen.
Leahy); 146 CONG. REc. H4357 (daily ed. June 14, 2000) (statement by Rep.
Dingell).
46. E-Sign § 101(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7001(a). There are varying views on what is in
or affecting interstate commerce, leaving a role for state legislation such as UETA.
Edward C. Winslow, III, Overviews of E-Sign and NCUETA, Lecture at the North
Carolina Bar Association CLE: Electronic Documents and Signatures in North
Carolina: The New Federal and North Carolina Laws (Oct. 26, 2000) (notes from
lecture on file with N.C. BANKING INST.) [hereinafter CLE Notes].

Although

Congress has interpreted the standard very broadly, so as to include almost
everything, state courts do not necessarily hold that view. Id.
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accurately reproduced.' One of the other noteworthy aspects of
E-Sign is that it is "technology neutral," setting up no minimal
requirements for security or confirmation purposes, essentially
allowing the parties to a transaction to determine the technologies
to be used.'
E-Sign has several explicit exceptions to its scope.49 Some
of these excluded areas are records or contracts governed by the
laws of wills, codicils, and testamentary trusts;' the U.C.C., except
for sections 1-107"' and 1-206,2 Article 2," and Article 2A; 4 and
notices of foreclosure or eviction 5
47. Id. § 101(e), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7001(e).
48. Id. § 106(5), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7006(5). See also supra note 14. Congress
recognized that some technologies are more secure than others, but believed that
consumers and business must be free to choose the appropriate technology for their
transactions given its nature and the need for assurances. 146 CONG. REc. H4360
(daily ed. June 14, 2000) (statement by Rep. Tauzin); 146 CONG. REc. S5223 (daily
ed. June 15, 2000) (statement by Sen. Leahy). Some argue that a government
mandate is required for widespread adoption of electronic signatures. Deborah
Bach, E-Sign Law Leaves Dizzying Leeway, Lawyer Says, AM. BANKER, Dec. 20,
2000, at 11 (U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray predicts one will be issued in three years).
Although not currently required to use them, many businesses that desire a high
security standard are already beginning to incorporate digital signatures into their
business models. See Power, supra note 18, at 14A. Wells Fargo & Co., Ameritrade
Holding Corp., and Bank One Corp. are all in the process of implementing digital
signature technologies into their operations. Id. It is likely for now that the use of
digital signature technologies will only be seen in high-dollar transaction areas due to
the cost of setting up the infrastructure required for large scale use. Industry Likes
E-Signatures, But Unsure on Infrastructure,AM. BANKER, Sept. 29,2000, at 10.
49. E-Sign § 103,15 U.S.C.A. § 7003.
50. Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act of 2000 (ESign) § 103(a)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7003(a)(1) (West Supp. 2000).
51. Id. § 103(a)(3), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7003(a)(3).
Section 1-107 governs
enforceability of a written, signed waiver after a breach. U.C.C. § 1-107 (1977).
52. E-Sign § 103(a)(3), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7003(a)(3). Section 1-206 sets out the
Statute of Frauds requirement for sale of property for more than five thousand
dollars. U.C.C. § 1-206 (1977).
53. E-Sign § 103(a)(3), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7003(a)(3). Article 2 governs the sale of
goods. U.C.C. Article 2 (1977).
54. Id. § 103(a)(3), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7003(a)(3). Article 2A governs leases. U.C.C.
Article 2A (1977).
55. Id. § 103(b)(2)(B), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7003(b)(2)(B). See also 146 CONG. REC.
H4349 (daily ed. June 14, 2000) (statement by Rep. Markey). Records or contracts
involved in divorce, adoption or other matters of family law are excluded from the
scope of E-Sign. E-Sign § 103(a)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7003(a)(2). E-Sign also excludes
court orders and other official court documents. Id. § 103(b)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. §
7003(b)(1). See also 146 CONG. REC. H4349 (daily ed. June 14, 2000) (statement by
Rep. Markey). Many courts have begun to accept electronic documents on their own
initiative. July Winslow Letter, supra note 45, at 6. For example, the Tenth Circuit
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Consumer Protections

E-Sign does not require a person or entity to use or accept
electronic records or signatures!' However, if a party conducting a
transaction with a consumer desires an electronic signature or
record to be legally effective, the consumer must affirmatively
consent to the use of such method.' Before the consent will be
held valid, a host of requirements must be fulfilled. 8 First, the
retailer must inform the consumer of the right to revoke consent,
the scope of the consent, and the right of the consumer to request
Court of Appeals allows electronic signatures to serve as original signatures for
briefs, motions, and other papers. 10TH CIR. R. 46.5(C). In addition, notices of
cancellation of utility services are exempted from E-Sign. E-Sign § 103(b)(2), 15
U.S.C.A. § 7003(b)(2). See also 146 CONG. REC. H4349 (daily ed. June 14, 2000)
(statement by Rep. Markey). This exclusion is only intended to apply to essential
services such as water, heat, and power. 146 CONG. REc. H4354 (daily ed. June 14,
2000) (statement by Rep. Bliley). Notice of cancellation of non-essential services
such as cable or telephone services could be sent electronically. Id. Section
103(b)(2)(C) further excludes notices of termination of life or health insurance and
notices of recalls of dangerous products. E-Sign § 103(b)(2)(C), 15 U.S.C.A. §
7003(b)(2)(C).
The final exemption in section 103 applies to documents
accompanying hazardous materials. Id. § 103(b)(3), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7003(b)(3).
56. Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act of 2000 (ESign) § 101(b)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7001(b)(2) (West Supp. 2000) See also 146 CONG.
REc. H4351 (daily ed. June 14, 2000) (statement by Rep. Bliley). E-Sign does not
seek to impose such requirements upon those individuals who still desire the paper
method of contracting; it merely removes barriers to those who wish to do so. E-Sign
§ 101(b)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7001(b)(2). An exception to this general rule concerns
government agencies. Id. § 101(b)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7001(b)(2).
57. E-Sign § 101(c)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7001(c)(1)(A). Consumer transactions
do not include business-to-business transactions, allowing business to bypass the
consumer protections when dealing with each other. 146 CONG. REc. S5224 (daily
edition June 15, 2000) (statement by Sen. Abraham). The consumer must also not
have withdrawn that consent (the original consent is not permanent). E-Sign §
101(c)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7001(c)(1)(A). However, federal regulatory agencies
may in special circumstances, and by following certain procedures, exempt specified
records from the consent requirement if it is "necessary to remove a substantial
burden to electronic commerce and will not increase the material risk of harm to
consumers." Id. § 104(d)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7004(d)(1). See, e.g., id. § 104(d)(2), 15
U.S.C.A. § 7004(d)(2) (setting out an initial example of such a process relating to the
Securities and Exchange Commission). The ability of state agencies to exempt
records from the consent requirements was explicitly rejected by Congress. 146
CONG. REC. S5222 (daily ed. June 15, 2000) (statement by Sen. Leahy). There is
some inconsistency as to how strict the standard should be in relation to this federal
agency power. Id. There is strong support for the ability of federal regulators to
remove the restrictions imposed by E-Sign by those who feel some of the restrictions
and regulations will quickly prove to be unnecessary. 146 CONG. REc. S5226 (daily
ed. June 15,2000) (statement by Sen. Gramm).
58. E-Sign § 101(c)(1)(B)-(C), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7001(c)(1)(B)-(C).
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a paper record. 9 Second, the consumer must be able to access the
records electronically.'
Note that the failure to satisfy the
consumer consent provisions of E-Sign does not invalidate the
underlying contract.61 E-Sign does not affect the consent or
disclosure requirements imposed by any other law or statute; it
merely places these additional requirements on the person using
the electronic record.62
59. Id. § 101(c)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7001(c)(1)(B). E-Sign supercedes the FED
rules on electronic notices to consumers for all agreements made with new or existing
customers on or after October 1, 2000 to deliver information electronically. Notice
of Consumer Consent Requirements Applicable to the Electronic Delivery of
ConsumerDisclosures,[Volume 5] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 60-733 (FDIC Fin.
Inst. Letter 72-2000). The new rules require that before consent can be given the
consumer must be provided certain information: 1) any right or option available to
receive a disclosure in paper form and the procedures to do so; 2) whether the
consent applies to only a particular transaction or to a range of transactions; 3) the
right to withdraw consent, the process for doing so, and the consequences or fees for
doing so; and 4) the hardware and software requirements to access and retain the
electronic information. Id.
60. E-Sign § 101(c)(1)(C), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7001(c)(1)(C). If the requirements
change to electronically access or retain the record or records in question, the
consumer must be informed of the new requirements and must be able to meet these
new requirements to ensure continued validity of the consent. Id. § 101(c)(1)(D), 15
U.S.C.A. § 7001(c)(1)(D). The requirement that the consumer's consent be
electronic or be confirmed electronically in a manner that reasonably demonstrates
the consumer's ability to access the electronic formats to which they consent is not
intended to be burdensome. 146 CONG. REc. H4352 (daily ed. June 14, 2000)
(statement by Rep. Bliley). This consent could be accomplished in many ways, with
one particular example being an e-mail response confirming that the necessary
attachments to an e-mail could be opened by the consumer. 146 CONG. REc. H4352
(daily ed. June 14,2000) (statement by Rep. Bliley); 146 CONG. REc. S5282 (daily ed.
June 16, 2000) (statement by Sen. Abraham). Some argue that this consent
requirement is too stringent and should be lessened. 146 CONG. REc. H4349 (daily
ed. June 14, 2000) (statement by Rep. Dreier). The rationale extended for the
consumer consent demonstration is that many consumers lack the technological
knowledge to completely understand the technical specifications of their computer,
especially more likely if consent is given by the consumer away from the computer
she normally uses. 146 CONG. REc. H4358 (daily ed. June 14, 2000) (statement by
Rep. Dingell); 146 CONG. REc. S5230 (daily ed. June 15, 2000) (statement by Sen.
Sarbanes).
61. E-Sign § 101(c)(3), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7001(c)(3). The validity of the contract
would rest on the normal principles of contract law as applicable in the pertinent
jurisdiction. 146 CoNG. REc. S5220 (daily ed. June 15, 2000) (statement by Sen.
Leahy). However, a company could not rely on the validity of an electronic record if
the consumer consent provisions were not satisfied. Id. This provision is only
intended to apply to electronic records, and it does not provide another basis to
invalidate an electronic contract. 146 CONG. Rnc. S5230 (daily ed. June 15, 2000)
(statement by Sen. Sarbanes).
62. Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act of 2000 (ESign) § 101(c)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7001(c)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2000). See also 146
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While these consumer protections were put in place to
ensure fraud prevention, they could play a strong role in
frustrating E-Sign's goal of expanding electronic commerce.'3
C.

PreemptionProvisions

To what extent does E-Sign preempt state law?' E-Sign
grants states the power to "modify, limit, or supersede the
provisions of [E-Sign] section 101 with respect to state law" in
certain situations.'
However, E-Sign confines this power to
specifically authorized methods.' E-Sign allows a state to enact its
own electronic signature and records law without fear of
preemption.' However, a state can only be completely certain no

preemption will take place if its version is identical to the UETA
approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on

Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL).' A state can also "modify, limit,
CONG. REc. H4360 (daily ed. June 14,2000) (statement of Rep. Tauzin); 146 CONG.
REc. S5221 (daily ed. June 15, 2000) (statement of Sen. Leahy); 146 CONG. REC.
H4357 (daily ed. June 14, 2000) (statement by Rep. Dingell). A wrongdoer may not
argue that by satisfying the requirements of E-Sign they are exempt from other antifraud laws. 146 CONG. REC. S5221 (daily ed. June 15, 2000) (statement of Sen.
Leahy). Additionally, a consumer is always allowed to allege forgery or any other
claim that would invalidate a signature in non-electric form. Id. For example, a
transaction entered into electronically would still be subject to the applicable unfair
and deceptive trade practices laws. 146 CONG. REC. H4357 (daily ed. June 14, 2000)
(statement by Rep. Dingell).
63. 146 CoNG. REC. S5219 (daily ed. June 15, 2000) (statement by Sen. Leahy).
Some congressmen argue that if a series of steps must be taken to even allow
electronic contracting, companies and individuals may decline to contract
electronically, finding it too time consuming or difficult to follow the steps as
compared to executing a traditional contract. See 146 CONG. REC. H4366 (daily ed.
June 14,2000) (statement by Rep. Conyers). There have been other criticisms of the
consumer protections, namely, that they unfairly discriminate against electronic
commerce. 146 CONG. REC. S5220 (daily ed. June 15, 2000) (statement by Sen.
Leahy).
64. Section 102 of E-Sign is the provision that governs the answer to this
question. See E-Sign § 102,15 U.S.C.A. § 7002.
65. Id. § 102(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7002(a) (emphasis added). Federal writing and
signature requirements are governed by E-Sign and cannot be affected by state laws.
Wittie & Wynn, supra note 5, at 326. Before the state law needs to be examined, the
determination of whether the transaction is in or affects interstate commerce must be
made. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
66. E-Sign § 102(a)(1)-(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7002(a)(1)-(2).
67. Id. § 102(a)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7002(a)(1).
68. E-Sign § 102(a)(1)-(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7002(a)(1)-(2). The NCCUSL is an
organization made up of over 300 lawyers, judges, and law professors from across the
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' E-Sign by implementing an alternative law that
or supersede"69
sets out the procedures for use and acceptance of electronic
records and signatures as long as the procedures are consistent
with the provisions of E-Sign and do not require or prefer the use
of a specific technology in the process." If a non-UETA approach
is taken by a state after the enactment of E-Sign, that law must
make specific reference to E-Sign.'
These preemption provisions come as the result of a
delicate balancing act by a Congress wanting to remove barriers to
electronic commerce by promoting uniformity on one hand, while
wanting to minimize preemption of state laws, especially UETA,
on the other.' In order to ensure further uniformity, E-Sign gives
preferential treatment to the passage of UETA by specifically
naming UETA as one of the exemptions to preemption. '3
A major question of preemption arises when a state adopts

United States assembled for the purpose of drafting uniform and model laws.
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, ABOUT Us,
at http://www.nccusl.org/aboutus.htm (last visited Feb. 28,2001). The organization, in
its 109th year, also strives to obtain legislative enactment of these uniform and model
laws. Id. See also infra notes 251-54 and accompanying text (discussing the
imposition of the federal government on state's law making ability).
69. E-Sign § 102(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7002(a).
70. Id. § 102(a)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7002(a)(2)(A). A state that enacted a nonuniform version of UETA would not be preempted to the extent that enactment met
the requirements of section 102 (a) of E-Sign. 146 CONG. REc. H14353 (daily ed. June
14, 2000) (statement of Rep. Bliley). Section 102(a) of E-Sign would also apply to
any laws enacted by a state to supplement or amend an enactment of UETA in an
endeavor to get around the preemption provision. Id. The technology-neutral
requirement is perhaps a redundancy, since a law that is not technology-neutral
would appear on its face to be inconsistent with E-Sign. See generally Electronic
Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act of 2000 (E-Sign), 15 U.S.C.A. §§
7001-7031 (West Supp. 2000).
71. E-Sign § 102(a)(2)(B), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7002(a)(2)(B).
72. 146 CONG. REc. S5224 (daily ed. June 15, 2000) (statement by Sen.
Abraham); see also Wittie & Wynn, supra note 5, at 325.
73. E-Sign § 102(a)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7002(a)(1). See also 146 CONG. REC. S5224
(daily ed. June 15, 2000) (statement by Sen. Abraham). The passage of E-Sign was
seen by many as a necessary gap filler until the states could catch up with the pressing
need of the technology sector to have some consistency and assurances that their
transactions would be legally binding. 146 CONG. REC. S5223 (daily ed. June 15,
2000) (statement by Sen. Abraham). The explicit exception granted by E-Sign to
states that adopt the official version of UETA was set out by Congress, because the
UETA was already a known act and the enactment of UETA in all states would
create a uniform national rule with substantially similar purposes and goals as E-Sign.
Wittie & Wynn, supra note 5, at 325.
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UETA, but not in the exact form set forth by the NCCUSL
Does the consistency standard set out by section 102 of E-Sign
apply to only the non-conforming provisions, or does it apply to
the entire version of UETA?75 There are three possible readings
of this provision of E-Sign: 1) inconsistent non-uniform provisions
are invalid, but the remainder of the provisions would survive; 2) if
any non-uniform provision is included, each provision (whether a
U-ETA provision or not) must then be examined for consistency
under subsection (a)(2); or 3) any non-uniform provision fails,
whether or not it would pass the consistency test.76
The first reading of the provision would work effectively if
a state adopted U'ETA with only a few minor additions or
changes.' However, problems could arise if a state adopted only a
few provisions of UETA and substituted alternative provisions to
round out its own electronic records and signatures law!8 The
second reading, subjecting every non-conforming provision of a
modified UETA to the consistency test, though a more time
consuming analysis, would more likely ensure the principles
originally conceived by the passage of E-Sign.79 The third reading
that any non-uniform provision fails regardless of the consistency
test does not seem like a logical reading of the statute.'o However,
74. See Wittie & Wynn, supra note 5, at 325; Patricia Brumfield Fry, Federal
Preemption and Electronic Commerce, http://www.nccusl.org/whatsnew-article3.htm
(last visited Feb. 28, 2001). A presumption is made that numbering, formatting, and
other non-substantive changes would not affect a determination of whether a state's
UETA was in the exact form of the NCCUSL-adopted UETA. Wittie & Wynn,
supra note 5, at 329 n.185.
75. Wittie & Wynn, supra note 5, at 329. Even if a state enacts the model
adopted by NCCUSL, if it incorporates exclusions other than those listed in UETA,
as UETA suggests in section 3(b)(4), those exclusions must also pass the consistency
test of section 102(a)(2)(A)(ii) of E-Sign. Fry, supra note 74.
76. Fry, supra note 74. There is an argument that the literal language of the Act
indicates the second reading is the answer. Id.
77. Wittie & Wynn, supra note 5, at 330.
78. Id. One argument that has been advanced is that although Congress saw fit
to allow preemption of E-Sign by the adoption of UETA, individual UETA
provisions are not always consistent with E-Sign provisions. Id. By allowing states to
pick and choose provisions from UETA, it would be possible for a state to construct
a set of laws, though incorporating UETA provisions, that do not share the same
principles and goals of E-Sign and UETA. Id.
79. Id. at 330-331 (arguing that this is the correct reading of section 102 of
E-Sign).
80. Id. The fact that there is a consistency test available for alternate provisions
suggests that the drafters expected the dual step test that would not even be
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until there is judicial review of the matter or regulatory
clarification,8 it may be impossible to determine with certainty
what the outcome would be in a state that has enacted a nonuniform UETA.'
V. UNIFORM ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT

A.

Legal Effect

The NCCUSL,n recognizing the pressing need for
uniformity between the states, adopted the UETA on July 29,
1999.' The main purpose of the UETA is set out in section 7: the
medium in which a signature, record, or contract is created or
presented is irrelevant to its legal significance.' More explicitly,
section 7 provides that a record, signature, or contract will not be
denied legal effect or enforceability solely because it is in or
incorporates an electronic form; furthermore, if the law requires
either a record to be in writing or a signature, an electronic form of
that record or signature satisfies the law.' The remainder of the
UETA serves to qualify, explain, and define the application of

permitted by such a strict reading of the statute. See Electronic Signatures in Global
and National Commerce Act of 2000 (E-Sign) § 102,15 U.S.C.A. § 7002 (West Supp.
2000).
81. Id. §104, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7004(a).
82. Fry, supra note 74.
83. See supra note 68.
84. Whittie, supra note 5, at 296. The NCCUSL began drafting the UETA in
1997. Id. Before the final draft was adopted by the NCCUSL, it was considered
section by section at two annual conferences. Carol A. Kunze, Background, at
http://www.webcom.com/legaled/ETAForum (last modified July 29, 1999) (created
for ETA Forum). Once approved by the drafting committee, the UETA was
approved by a majority of the states attending the conference. See id. When drafting
UETA, NCCUSL sought to incorporate several underlying principles: 1) application
of the same legal standard to all transactions whether electronic or paper based; 2)
technological neutrality; 3) minimalism; and 4) avoidance of regulation. Shea C.
Meehan, Comment, Consumer Protection Law and the Uniform Electronic
TransactionsAct (UETA): Why States Should Adopt UETA as Drafted, 36 IDAHO L.
REv. 563,583 (2000).
85. UNIFORM ELECTRONICTRANSACTIONS Acr (UETA) (1999) § 7 cmt. 1 (1999).
Section 7 is substantially the same as the analogous provision in E-Sign. Whittie,
supra note 5, at 298.
86. UETA § 7.
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these principles.'
B.

Scope

The UETA applies to electronic records and signatures
only as they relate to a transaction.' "Transactions," according to
the UETA, include actions between people for business,
commercial, or governmental purposes.' The UETA sets out
particular exceptions to what transactions are covered, 9' including
transactions governed by the law of wills, codicils or testamentary
trusts;9 a transaction governed by the UCC excepting sections 1107, 1-206, Article 2 and Article 2A;' and transactions governed
by the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
(UCITA). 9 The determination of whether an electronic record or
signature is or is not covered by the UETA could change with the
specific context of its use.' Beyond the initial purpose of the
UETA (to remove barriers to the electronic signing and retention
of documents), the Act defers to existing substantive law to
87. Id. §§2to3.
88. Id. § 3. It is noteworthy that subsections (c) and (d) only apply to the
requirement for a record to be in writing or signed and does not address any
additional requirements imposed by the law on a record. See UETA § 7 cmt. 3.
89. UETA § 2 cmt. 12. Unilateral acts do not constitute transactions under the
UETA. Id. Therefore, the UETA does not cover acts such as wills, trusts, or
healthcare powers of attorney that do not involve another person. Id. However, the
UETA does cover all electronic records related to a transaction, so many records not
constituting a transaction on their own terms would be covered. See id. Despite this
implicit distinction, the drafters saw fit to include "transactions" if they are covered
by "a law governing the creation of wills, codicils, or testamentary trusts" in the
exceptions to the initial scope of the UETA. Id. § 3(b)(1).
90. UETA § 3(b).
91. UNIFORM ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT (UETA) § 3(b)(1) (1999).
92. Id. § 3(b)(2). Transactions covered by the U.C.C. are excluded, except for
the enumerated sections, because the revision of Articles 5, 8, and 9 encompassed
considerations of electronic process. Id. § 3 cmt. 5. See supra notes 51-54.
93. UETA § 3(b)(3). The UCITA exclusion is based on the premise that the
drafting process of UCITA already incorporated consideration of electronic
contracting. See UETA § 3 cmt. 5. North Carolina has not adopted UCITA. CLE
Notes, supra note 46.
94. UETA § 3(c). For example, a real estate transaction, as far as it relates to a
transaction between two parties would conceivably be covered by UETA. See id.
However to the extent the transaction concerns third parties, i.e., filing of a deed with
the registrar of deeds, it would not be covered by UETA (that is, of course, unless the
states adopt an electronic deed filing system). See id.
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determine the questions of the validity of the signature.95
The UETA has been enacted in one form or another in at
least twenty-three states.96 Adoption of the Act is also under
consideration in at least ten other jurisdictionsY Such a rapid
legislative pace is in accord with the goal of E-Sign to facilitate the
enactment of uniform state laws governing electronic records and
signatures."
C.

Post-E-Sign Enactments of UETA: The North Carolina
Example

Given the special treatment spelled out in E-Sign for states
that enact UETA as adopted by the NCCUSL,' the states that
have not enacted electronic signature and record laws as of the
enactment of E-Sign'" most likely will find adoption of UETA
more attractive than creating their own laws, thereby avoiding the
consistency test of section 102 of E-Sign. 0 ' Soon after the
enactment of E-Sign, North Carolina enacted its own law
governing electronic signatures, adopting a version of UETA on
July 12, 2000.'0
95. See Prefatory Note to UETA. The existing substantive laws of contracts
remain intact after the enactment of UETA. See id.
96. Carol A. Kunze, What's Happening to UETA in the States, at
http://www.uetaonline.com/hapsate.html (last modified Feb. 6, 2001) (created for
UETA Online). Twenty-three states have enacted UETA: Arizona, California,
Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine,
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, and Virginia. Id.
97. Id. Ten states are considering UETA: Arkansas, Connecticut, Mississippi,
Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, Texas, and Vermont.
Id.
98. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
99. Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act of 2000 (ESign) § 102(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7002(a) (West Supp. 2000).
100. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
101. See E-Sign § 102(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7002(a).
102. Letter from Edward C. Winslow, III, Attorney, Brooks, Pierce, McLendon,
Humphrey, & Leonard, LLP, and Matthew G. Bibbens, to Paul H. Stock, Executive
Vice President and Counsel, N.C. Bankers Association 3 (August 9, 2000) (on file
with the N.C. BANKING INST.) [hereinafter August Winslow Letter]. The N.C.
Legislature made quick work of this statute, with its introduction to the General
Assembly on May 17, 2000. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-308 (2000). See also Ed Winslow,
Federal and State Statutes Authorize Electronic Signatures and Contracts, 21 NOTEs
BEARING INTEREST, 1 (2000) [hereinafter Winslow Article].
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There are several differences between the North Carolina
Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (NC-UETA) and the UETA
as adopted by NCCUSL.' ° As mandated by section 102(a)(2)(B)
of E-Sign, NC-UETA, ° since it is not a uniform adoption of
UETA, includes a specific reference to E-Sign.S In determining
the extent to which E-Sign will preempt NC-UETA, this Note will
use two different approaches to analyze the preemption effect. '
The first approach subjects only the provisions of NC-UETA that
are not identical to the provisions in UETA to the consistency test
of section 102 of E-Sign, leaving those provisions that are identical
intact."° The second approach subjects every provision of NCUETA to the consistency test of section 102 of E-Sign even if the
provision is identical to a corresponding provision in UETA. °8
1. Non-Uniform Provisions Examined Under
the Consistency Test
Under the first approach, only those provisions inconsistent
with UETA will be examined under the consistency standard of
section 102 of E-Sign-the remainder of the provisions will not
undergo preemption by E-Sign.'"
There are several major
differences between UETA and NC-UETA: 1) an additional
exclusion to the scope;11° 2) variance in the provisions on
notarization and acknowledgment of records;.. 3) qualifying
language in the major provision;' 4) the sending and receipt of
103. See generally August Winslow Letter, supra note 102.
104. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 66-308.1-308.17.
105. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-308.16(a). See also August Winslow Letter, supra note
102, at 3. This is the only reference to E-Sign in the NC-UETA. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 66-308.1-308.17. This reference should satisfy the requirement of section
102(a)(2)(B) of E-Sign since the purpose of the E-Sign provision is to allow for ease
of tracking action by the states with reference to electronic signature and record laws
through research. 146 CONG. REC. H4354 (daily edition June 14,2000) (statement by
Rep. Bliley).

106.
review
107.
108.
109.

See supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text. It is likely that only judicial
or regulatory clarification will determine the appropriate analysis. See id.
See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 76, 79 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.

110. See infra notes 116-118 and accompanying text.

111. See infra notes 119-122 and accompanying text.
112. See infranotes 123-125 and accompanying text.
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electronic records;... 5) the consumer consent rules;.. and 6) the
exclusion of provisions dealing with government agencies' use of
electronic records.115
Though NC-UETA tracks the UETA in its scope, the
General Statutes of North Carolina, section 66-308.2(b)(3) adds
one more exclusion to the North Carolina version of the Act by
excluding Article 11A of Chapter 66 of the General Statutes (the
Electronic Commerce in Government Act)."6 The Electronic
Commerce in Government Act authorizes all public agencies to
accept electronic signatures."7 This addition appears to be
consistent with the provisions of E-Sign, given the exclusions
granted to similar government areas in the federal act. 1
A closely linked difference in NC-UETA concerns
notarization and acknowledgment of records in the context of the
government."9 This indirect variation comes as a result of the
113. See infra notes 126-133 and accompanying text.
114. See infra notes 134-136 and accompanying text.
115. See infra notes 137-138 and accompanying-text.
116. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-308.2(b)(3) (2000). See also Winslow Article, supra
note 102, at 3. North Carolina has not adopted UCITA and therefore does not
recognize it as an exclusion to its scope. CLE Notes, supra note 46. However, some
of the principles that underlie UETA's recognition of the UCITA seem to justify the
non-preemption of exclusion of the Electronic Commerce in Government Act. See
supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text. The remainder of the exceptions to scope
found in NC-UETA are consistent with those found in E-Sign and therefore would
not need to face preemption. See August Winslow Letter, supra note 102, at 4-5.
117. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-58.4(a). The Electronic Commerce in Government Act
sets a higher technological standard than NC-UETA and E-Sign, requiring
certification of the signature and the ability to tell if it has been altered. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 66-58.5(a)(2) (stating that if the data has been altered, the signature must be
invalidated).
118. See Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act of 2000 (ESign) § 104, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7004 (West Supp. 2000) (establishing its applicability to
federal and state governments). This provision is consistent with the decision not to
include UETA sections 17 through 19, which deal with government agencies. See
infra notes 137-138 and accompanying text.
119. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-308.10. See also August Winslow Letter, supra note
102, at 9. The National Notary Association has taken a position in regards to
electronic notarization consisting of three goals: 1) maintaining the fundamental
principles of notarization regardless of changes in technology; 2) personal presence
before a notary still required; and 3) training and certification for notaries must be
strengthened to stress the new technologies in use.
NATIONAL NOTARY
AssOCIATION, A POSITION ON DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAWS AND NOTARIZATION, 5-6

(2000) (on file with the N.C. BANKING INST.). The National Notary Association does
recognize that reliable technologies may become available to allow for "personal
presence" through audiovisual links or the like. Id. at 6.
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exclusion of commerce with the government from the scope of
NC-UETA."
The pertinent provision of the Electronic
Commerce in Government Act states signatures "that require
attestation by a notary public may not be in the form of an
electronic signature."12' The question of preemption under this
section is tied closely to the scope analysis."
The key provision of NC-UETA, section 66-308.6 of the
North Carolina General Statutes, though substantially the same as
UETA section 7, includes qualifying language following
subsections (c) and (d)."n The qualifying language tacked onto the
ends of subsections (c) and (d) is: "provided it complies with the
provisions of this Article." 24 It is unclear whether such qualifying
language would result in a preemption of this provision of NCUETA.12
Another place that NC-UETA differs from UETA is under
the provision governing the sending and receiving of electronic
records."
NC-UETA includes a special rule for consumer
transactions governing the receipt of electronic records not present
in the UETA 27 Under NC-UETA, the record must be received in
a manner that the sender reasonably believes the recipient can
120. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-308.2(b)(3). See also August Winslow Letter, supra
note 102, at 9. The Electronic Commerce in Government Act controls this aspect of
notarization. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-58.4(b).
121. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-58.4(b) (2000).
122. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-308.2(b)(3). If the scope provision was preempted
by E-Sign then there would be no issue under section 66-308.10 of the North Carolina
General Statute because the section follows UETA and the exclusion comes solely
from the scope provision of NC-UETA. See supra notes 116-118 and accompanying
text; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-308.10. E-Sign does not preempt procurement laws, so if
the Electronic Commerce in Government Act is interpreted as a procurement law
then it would be likely to stand. August Winslow Letter, supra note 102, at 10.
123. August Winslow Letter, supra note 102, at 6.
124. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-308.6(c)-(d).
125. The qualifying language seems superfluous. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-308.6.
In order for an electronic signature or record to be valid, the implication is that it
would have to comply with the authorizing provisions of the Act. See id. However,
there could be some sort of unanticipated interaction between the remainder of the
provisions of NC-UETA, especially if many provisions differ from the uniform
UETA, that would result in the qualifying language creating an inconsistency with ESign-preempting sections 66-308.6(c) & (d) of the North Carolina General Statutes.
See id.
126. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-308.14(e). See also August Winslow Letter, supra note
102, at 11.
127. August Winslow Letter, supra note 102, at 11.
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open in order to be officially received." Though it is unclear if
such a provision will be sustained, there are two arguments for not
preempting the provision: 1) E-Sign does not address this
particular issue,' and 2) this provision is consistent with the high
level of consumer protection offered by E-Sign."
NC-UETA makes one more change to this section,
negating the subsection of UETA providing that an electronic
record is received even if no individual is aware of its receipt.3 ESign does not include this provision either;' 32 therefore, it is
difficult to envision how such an exclusion could be found to be
inconsistent with E-Sign.133
One clear way that NC-UETA differs from UETA is that it
includes the consumer consent rule found in E-Sign but not in
UETA.lM The consumer consent rule in NC-UETA is closely
modeled on provisions in E-Sign, but goes further than E-Sign by
requiring that a written contract be given to a consumer who uses
the seller's electronic equipment provided by the seller to contract
or consent. 35 E-Sign addressed consumer consent issues but did
128. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-308.14(e) (2000). Since not addressed by UETA, the
analysis must turn to consistency with the principles of E-Sign. See Electronic
Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act of 2000 (E-Sign) § 102(a)(2)(A),
15 U.S.C.A. § 7002(a)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2000).
129. The argument can be made that E-Sign does not address this issue, so NCUETA may not be inconsistent with any provision of E-Sign addressing this
particular issue. Wittie & Wynn, supra note 5, at 331.
130. See, e.g., E-Sign § 101(c)(1)(C), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7001(c)(1)(C) (requiring that
the consumer be able to reasonably demonstrate that the consumer can access the
information).
131. August Winslow Letter, supra note 102, at 12.
132. Id. at 11.
133. See E-Sign § 102(a)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7002(a)(2)(A) (setting out the
consistency standard). E-Sign leaves such sending and receiving matters to the
substantive law already in place. See E-Sign § 101(b)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7001(b)(1)
(savings clause in E-Sign). Since this covers a subject area not addressed by E-Sign it
should not be viewed as inconsistent. Wittie & Wynn, supra note 5, at 331.
134. Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act of 2000 (ESign) § 101(c), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7001(c) (West Supp. 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66308.16(c) (2000). See also August Winslow Letter, supra note 102, at 13. Section 66308.16(a) is where E-Sign is referred to by NC-UETA as required by section
102(a)(2)(B) of E-Sign. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-308.16(a). Section 66-308.16(b) also
incorporates the exclusions to the rule found in section 103(b)(2) of E-Sign.
Compare E-Sign § 103(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7003(b), with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66308.16(b).
135. Compare E-Sign § 101(c), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7001(c), with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66308.16(d) (illustrating that the North Carolina statute is more protective of
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not include a requirement of a written contract, probably
rendering this provision in NC-UETA inconsistent with E-Sign."
The final difference between the provisions of UETA and
NC-UETA is the exclusion of the sections dealing with electronic
records: retention, distribution, acceptance, and consistency in
reference to governmental agencies." According to the official
comment to the UETA, these sections are optional for states to
adopt and their exclusion does not have a detrimental effect on the
uniformity of the enactment."
2. Each Provision Examined Under
the Consistency Test...
The second approach" to the preemption analysis of NCUETA requires each provision of NC-UETA to be examined
under the consistency test set out in E-Sign 1 For example, NCUETA is consistent with E-Sign in not requiring the use of
electronic records or signatures.14" However, section 66-308.4 of
NC-UETA includes a provision" clearly inconsistent with E-Sign,
which allows statutory rules in NC-UETA to vary by agreement,
unless specifically prohibited by NC-UETA." Another prime
consumers in this aspect).
136. E-Sign § 101(c), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7001(c).
137. UNIFORM ELECrRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT (UETA) §§ 17-19 (1999); August
Winslow Letter, supra note 102, at 15.
138. UETA §§ 17-19 legislative note regarding adoption. Under section 102(a)(1)
of E-Sign these three sections are therefore irrelevant to the analysis. E-Sign §
102(a)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7002(a)(1); UETA §§ 17-19 legislative note regarding
adoption.
139. The analysis in "approach one" covers those provisions not identical to
provisions in UETA; and therefore, the analysis of those particular provisions,
obviously necessary in an analysis of each provision, will be referenced in "approach
one" instead of repeating the identical analysis for those provisions in "approach
two." See supra notes 109-138 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 76,79 and accompanying text.
141. Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act of 2000 (ESign) § 102(a)(2)(A)(i), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7002(a)(2)(A)(i) (West Supp. 2000).
142. Compare E-Sign § 101(b)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7002(a)(2)(A)(i), with N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 66-308.4(a) (2000) (showing that neither statute imposes a requirement to use
an electronic signature)..
143. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-308.4(d).
144. August Winslow Letter, supra note 102, at 6; Edward C. Winslow, III,
Overviews of E-Sign and NCUETA, Lecture at the North Carolina Bar Association
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provision for preemption by E-Sign is the section of NC-UETA
specifying that if any other law requires a record to be sent or
transmitted in a certain matter, it must be done in that manner.'45
E-Sign does not permit a state to circumvent E-Sign by imposing
non-electronic delivery methods, a distinct possibility opened by
14 6
NC-UETA in referencing other laws outside of the Act.
In another example, attribution and effect of electronic
records and signatures is an area directly addressed by NC-UETA
but not by E-Sign.' Additional areas covered by NC-UETA will
not likely be preempted, because they are either outside the realm
covered by E-Sign and therefore cannot be deemed inconsistent,
or they merely attempt to codify existing principles of law in

CLE: Electronic Documents and Signatures in North Carolina: The New Federal and
North Carolina Laws (Oct. 26, 2000) (notes from lecture on file with N.C. Banking
Inst.). Although NC-UETA prevents modification of agreements concerning
consumer protections, such agreements could create potential problems in other
sections of NC-UETA. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-308.16(a). "The requirements of
this section may not be varied by agreement of the parties." Id.
145. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-308.7(b). See also August Winslow Letter, supra note
102, at 7.
146. See E-Sign § 102(c), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7002(c). By requiring other laws to be
followed, some of which may require non-electronic transmission this subsection of
E-Sign would be violated. 146 CONG. REC. S5224 (daily ed. June 15, 2000)
(statement of Sen. Abraham). "Any attempt by a State to use 8(b)(2) to violate the
spirit of this Act should be treated as an effort to circumvent and thus be void." 146
CONG. REC. H4354 (daily ed. June 14,2000) (statement of Rep. Bliley). However, if
the delivery methods required were electronic and do not require paper form
delivery or if there is an electronic alternative to the non-electronic delivery method
imposed, the action by a state to impose delivery requirements would appear to be
safe. 146 CONG. REC. H4358 (daily ed. June 14, 2000) (statement by Rep. Dingell);
146 CONG. REc. S5222 (daily ed. June 15, 2000) (statement of Sen. Leahy). There is
some concern as to how this issue will be addressed in relation to federal delivery
requirements and state delivery requirements in jurisdictions that do not enact the
UETA since E-Sign is silent on the question. 146 CONG. REc. S5222 (daily ed. June
15, 2000) (statement by Sen. Leahy). "[B]ecause repeal and preemption by
implication are disfavored, a court or agency interpreting the legislation could
reasonably conclude that these Federal and State delivery requirements remain in
full force and effect." Id. However, the legislature had no intent that E-Sign be read
to give effect to such delivery requirements. Id.
147. Compare Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act of
2000 (E-Sign) § 101(b)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7001(b)(1) (West Supp. 2000), with N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 66-308.8 (2000). E-Sign impliedly addresses this topic by deferring to
existing law applying to the general realm of attribution and effect of records and
signatures. E-Sign § 101(b)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7001(b)(1) (savings clause). NCUETA is merely attempting to apply these existing principles in an electronic
environment. August Winslow Letter, supra note 102, at 8.
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relation to an electronic environment." Two other NC-UETA
provisions supplemental to E-Sign concern errors or changes in an
electronic record occurring during a transmission,'49 and the
admissibility of electronic records or signatures as evidence in a
"proceeding."'"
The extent to which E-Sign will preempt NC-UETA
depends heavily upon which interpretation the courts take when
analyzing section 102 of E-Sign. 5' Different results could occur
from one preemption approach as compared to the other. 2
D.

Pre-E-SignEnactments of UETA: The CaliforniaExample

This section examines how a pre-E-Sign enactment of
UETA will fare by analyzing California's version of UETA (CAUETA). 5 ' On September 16, 1999," California became the first
state to enact an electronic signatures law incorporating the
provisions of UETA. 5 CA-UETA, though similar to UETA, is
not identical." However, since CA-UETA57 was enacted well
148. See E-Sign § 102(a)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7002(a)(1). See also supra note 129.
149. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-308.9. This section allocates burdens and faults if errors
or changes occur, giving more certainty to the parties conducting the transaction in
case of an error. See id. As a fall back measure, the section applies "other law,
including the law of mistake," if the other subsections do not apply. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 66-308.9(3).
150. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-308.12. "The statute does not relieve parties from
establishing the foundation required by the rules of evidence for admission of
electronic records in federal or state courts." August Winslow Letter, supra note 102,
at 10. The term "proceeding" used in the statute is not defined. Id.
151. See supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 109-150 and accompanying text.
153. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1633.1-1633.17 (West 2000). See also infra notes 154-207
and accompanying text.
154. 1999 Cal. Stat. 820. The bill was introduced February 25, 1999 by Senators
Sher and Bowen. Id. The bill was passed in the Assembly September 7, 1999 and in
the Senate September 9, 1999. Id. On September 16, 1999 the governor signed the
bill into law and it was filed with the Secretary of State. Id.
155. Assembly Comm. on Judiciary, Comm. Report for 1999 Senate Bill No. 820,
1999-2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2000) (statement of Adam B. Schiff, Chairman of Judiciary
Comm.). CA-UETA, sections 1633.1 to 1633.17 of the Cal. Civil Code, became
effective on January 1, 2000. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1633.4 (West 2000).
156. Assembly Comm. on Judiciary, Comm. Report for 1999 Senate Bill No. 820,
1999-2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2000) (statement of Adam B. Schiff, Chairman of Judiciary
Comm.).
157. See supra notes 154-155 and accompanying text.
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before E-Sign,158 the requirement to specifically reference E-Sign
5 9 In order to examine the preemption
in the act does not apply."
effect E-Sign will have on CA-UETA, the varying approaches to
the consistency test of E-Sign'" must again be used. 6 ' The first
approach subjects only the provisions of CA-UETA that are not
identical to the provisions in UETA to the consistency test of
section 102 of E-Sign, leaving those provisions that are identical
intact.62 The second approach would subject every provision of
CA-UETA to the consistency test of section 102 of E-Sign, even if
the provision is identical to a corresponding provision in UETA.'"
1. Non-Uniform Provisions Examined
Under the Consistency Test
First, only the portions of CA-UETA that are not uniform
with UETA will be subjected to the consistency test of E-Sign."'
The major differences between UETA and CA-UETA are 1) the
definition of electronic signatures; 65 2) additional exclusions to the
scope of CA-UETA;'" 3) the addition of a provision addressing
standard form consumer consent contracts; 67 and 4) electronic
records and signatures in reference to statements signed under the
penalty of perjury."
A discrepancy between UETA and CA-UETA occurs in
the definition of electronic signatures, in which CA-UETA adds
the word "electronic" each time before the word "record"
appears.'69 While such a change may seem unimportant, it could
158. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.

159. Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act of 2000 (ESign) § 102(a)(2)(B), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7002(a)(2)(B) (West Supp. 2000).
160. Id. § 102(a)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7002(a)(2).
161. See supra notes 109-152 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 76, 79 and accompanying text.
164. E-Sign § 102(a)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7002(a)(2). See also supra notes 109-138
and accompanying text (analyzing NC-UETA using this test).
165. See infra notes 169-173 and accompanying text.
166. See infra notes 174-182 and accompanying text.
167. See infra notes 183-185 and accompanying text.
168. See infra notes 186-187 and accompanying text.
169. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE § 1633.2(h) (West 2000) with UNIFORM
ELEcrRONIC TRANSACTIONS

AcT § 2(8) (1999); "'Electronic signature' means an
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limit the scope of electronic signature application compared to that
17
under E-Sign and UETA's definitions of "record""
and
17
"electronic record." '
Since the definition of "electronic
signature" under CA-UETA" is inconsistent with E-Sign, it is
likely that the additional words will be purged by the preemption
provision of E-Sign.ln
In comparison with UETA, the exclusion section of
California's UETA is riddled with discrepancies. 74 California's
UETA accepts UETA's invitation17" to insert other exceptions into
the act. 6 E-Sign deals directly with this sort of exception and
would likely preempt this addition by the California legislature."
CA-UETA also inserts an additional section of exclusions to the
exclusions laid out by UETA 7' The preemptive effect of these
electronic sound, symbol, or process attached to or logically associated with an
electronic record and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the
electronic record." CAL. CIV. CODE § 1633.2(h) (emphasis added). Since the
definition only requires the electronic signature to be logically associated with the
electronic record, it could be imagined that an electronic signature could be logically
associated with a non-electronic record, which would not be allowed under the CAUETA. Id. For example, an electronic signature on an electronic document could be
necessary for the validity of an integrated set of documents including other nonelectronic documents-a concept not governed by CA-UETA under a strict reading
of the definition of electronic signature. See id.
170. Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act of 2000 (ESign) § 106(9), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7006(9) (West Supp. 2000); UETA § 2(13).
171. E-Sign § 106(4), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7006(4); UNIFORM ELECrRONIC
TRANSACrIONS Acr (UETA) § 2(7) (1999).
172. See supra note 169.
173. E-Sign § 102(a)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7002(a)(2). The narrow definition is not
consistent with the goal of E-Sign to facilitate the ease of contracting when the
definition is limiting in its nature. See 146 CONG. REc. S5224 (daily ed. June 15,
2000) (statement by Sen. Abraham).
174. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE § 1633.3, with UETA § 3.
175. UETA § 3(b)(4).
176. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1633.3(b)(4).
177. See Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act of 2000 (ESign) § 102(a)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7002(a)(1) (West Supp. 2000).
178. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1633.3(c). This section includes a long list of particular
exclusions to the act. Id. For example, CA-UETA does not apply to certain other
sections of the California Code: 1) transactions described in section 17511.5 of the
Business and Professions Code (telephonic sales transactions); 2) Section 3071.5 of
the Civil Code (release of an owners interest in a vehicle subject to a lien); 3) Section
18608 of the Financial Code (notice of cancellation of insurance policy); 4) Section
22328 of the Financial Code (notice required to be sent by U.S. mail for repossession
of an automobile with a lien attached); 5) Section 1358.15 of the Health and Safety
Code (notice requirement of modification of Medicare supplement contracts); 6)
Section 10127.7 of the Insurance Code (notice requirement and policy for returning a
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additions will be on a case-by-case basis, since some are in line
with those types of transactions excluded in E-Sign.79 The final
difference in the exclusion section involves a section in CA-UETA
that spells out the ability of previously excluded transactions still
to be conducted electronically if other applicable law allows such a
method."s This section seems to expand upon the previous two
subsections, combining the ideas expressed in them to explicitly set
out the implications that arise from them. 8 Since the previous two
subsections are in line with the E-Sign, the subsection in question
would appear to be as well."n
Like UETA, CA-UETA does not require the use of
electronic records or signatures."n However CA-UETA goes
beyond UETA by addressing the use of standard form contracts in
obtaining the consent to conduct transactions electronically." It
seems such a protection has the same underlying goal of those
protections found in E-Sign: to prevent a more sophisticated
individual or entity from taking advantage of those less
sophisticated by trickery or misdirection."
life insurance policy upon receipt to effect a cancellation); 7) Section 779.1 of the
Public Utilities Code (notice requirement before termination of public utilities); and
8) Section 1162 of the Code of Civil Procedure (notice requirement in a summary
proceeding for obtaining possession of real property in certain cases). Id. For a more
thorough discussion of each of the particular statutory exclusions, see also Gail
Hillebrand, The California Exemptions to UETA, Consumers Union, at
http:lwww.consumersunion.orglfinance/9991wcOO.htm (Jan. 2000).
179. Compare, e.g., E-Sign § 103(b)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7003(b)(2) with CAL. PUB.
UTIL. CODE § 779.1 (Deering 2000).
180. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1633.3(f). For example, some courts are allowing the use
of electronic court records. See supra note 50. For example, the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals allows electronic signatures to serve as original signatures for briefs,
motions, and other papers. 10TH CIR. R. 46.5(C).
181. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1633.3(d) (allowing a transaction coming under
exclusions in previously existing law to come under the act when used for a
transaction not under the rubric of those exclusions); CAL. Civ. CODE § 1633.3(e)
("A transaction subject to this title is also subject to other applicable substantive
law.").
182. UNIFORM ELECrRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT § 3(c)-(d) (1999).
183. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1633.5(a).
184. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1633.5(b). It appears from the statute that a standard form
contract can be used to obtain consent from another party in a couple of situations: 1)
if the contract is in electronic form; or 2) if in non-electronic form, the sole purpose
of the contract is to authorize a transaction by electronic means. Id.
185. See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text. An unscrupulous party could
use a standard form contract incorporating many terms and bury the consent to
electronic transaction provision somewhere within the other terms. Id.
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CA-UETA includes a section setting forth the
requirements for electronic records and signatures in reference to
statements signed under penalty of perjury."'
Though not
included in UETA, E-Sign's general acceptance of electronic
records and signatures and its deference to existing substantive law
would most likely include statements signed under penalty of
perjury by implication.l"
A new bill has been introduced in the California senate that
would make various changes to the current CA-UETA if passed."n
In its current form, the bill addresses all four of the major
differences discussed above and brings them in line with UETA.
Whether the bill makes its way through the California legislature
or not, the message is clear: California is attempting to amend its
version of UETA to come within the guidelines set out by ESign. 1
2. Each Provision Examined Under Consistency Test.9'
Under the second approach, each provision of CA-UETA
186. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1633.11(b).
187. See Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act of 2000 (ESign) § 101(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7001(a) (West Supp. 2000).
188. S. 97 (Ca. 2001). Senator Sher introduced the bill on January 18, 2001. Id.
The bill would repeal the current CA-UETA and replace it. Id.
189. Id. Section 1633.2(8) of the new bill, which corresponds to section 1633.2(h)
of the current CA-UETA removes the word "electronic" that appears before the
word "record" in the definition of "electronic signature." Compare CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1633.2(h) with S. 97 (Ca. 2001). The new bill also addresses the exclusions problem
with the current CA-UETA by removing the exclusions CA-UETA includes in
section 1633.3 beyond the ,ones laid out in UETA. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE §
1633.3 with S. 97 (Ca. 2001). In addition the new bill removes the provision found in
section 1633.5(b) of the current CA-UETA that concerns the use of standard form
contracts in obtaining consumer consent. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE § 1633.5(b) with
S. 97 (Ca. 2001). Finally, the new bill removes the section found in the current CATETA, concerning electronic records and signatures in reference to statements
signed under penalty of perjury. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE § 1633.11(b) with S. 97
(Ca. 2001).
190. See S. 97, 2001-2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2001); E-Sign § 102(a), 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 7002(a).
191. The analysis in "approach one" covers those provisions not identical to
provisions in UETA and therefore the analysis of those particular provisions,
obviously necessary in an analysis of each provision, will be referenced in "approach
one" instead of repeating the identical analysis for those provisions in "approach
two." See supra notes 164-190 and accompanying text.
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must be analyzed under the consistency test set out in E-Sign.1 2
Some of the provisions in CA-UETA taken directly from UETA
still seem likely to be preempted by E-Sign,1 3 while preemption of
a few provisions is questionable. 4
One likely target of preemption by E-Sign is the provision
in CA-UETA allowing for variance by agreement of any
provision, except those specified unalterable. 95 Another possible
provision that could face preemption is the subsection of CAUETA specifying that other laws requiring a record to be
displayed, sent, or transmitted in a certain manner shall apply. 96
E-Sign does not allow imposition of non-electronic delivery
methods by a state in an effort to circumvent the federal law.1"
The reference to laws outside of CA-UETA could conceivably
include laws that require non-electronic delivery of a record, which
in most circumstances would be in direct violation of the
provisions of E-Sign.9
However, a few provisions of CA-UETA are less likely to
be preempted by E-Sign."' CA-UETA, unlike E-Sign, specifically
sets out rules for attribution of records.' CA-UETA lays down
standards for when a record is deemed sent and when a record is
deemed received while E-Sign leaves such questions to the existing
law in this area.Y Though not in E-Sign, the attribution provisions
192. E-Sign § 102(a)(2)(A)(i), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7002(a)(2)(A)(i). See also supra
notes 140-152 and accompanying text (NC-UETA analyzed using this approach).
193. See infra notes 195-198 and accompanying text.

194. See infra notes 199-205 and accompanying text.
195. See CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1633.5(d) (West 2000). Though such a provision
would be more likely to promote adaptation by parties to better facilitate the use of
electronic records and signatures, it runs counter to the protectionist view taken by
E-Sign. See generally Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act of
2000 (E-Sign) §§101-401, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7001-7031 (West Supp. 2000); CLE Notes,
supra note 46.
196. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1633.8(b).
197. E-Sign § 102(c), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7002(c).

198. However, in some circumstances the laws requiring a specific method of
display, delivery, or transmission of the record could come within the transactions

already excluded from the scope of E-Sign, such as transactions involving wills and
codicils. E-Sign § 103(a)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7003(a)(1).
199. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1633.13, 1633.15.
200. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1633.15.
201. CompareE-Sign § 101(b)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7001(b)(1), with CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1633.15.
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of CA-UETA are not likely to be preempted, since the thrust of
the section is to apply the existing law in an electronic
environment.' CA-UETA also includes a provision on the use of
evidence of a record or signature in an electronic form. 3 This
provision would be consistent with E-Sign in that it is another
codification of the principle that electronic signatures or records
will not be denied legal effect simply because they are in electronic
form. 4 Additionally, the argument could be made that both the
attribution provision and the evidentiary provision are consistent
with E-Sign since the provisions cover subject areas not addressed
25
by E-Sign. 0
As was the case in analyzing North Carolina's version of
the UETA, the extent to which E-Sign will preempt CA-UETA
depends upon the approach the courts will take in interpreting
section 102 of E-Sign.2
However, once a few courts begin
interpreting section 102 of E-Sign, other jurisdictions should be
able to predict the outcome if a question arises about the
consistency of E-Sign and UETA enactments.'
VI. NoN-UETA ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE LAWS

A.

The New York Example

On August 5, 1999, the New York Legislature passed the
Electronic Signatures and Records Act (ESRA), and Governor
Pataki signed it into law on September 29, 1999.' The Act was an
202. See supra note 147.
203. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1633.13. This section's only purpose is to ensure that the
evidence will not be excluded for the sole sake of being in electronic form. Id. The

section does not change the requirements of the rules of evidence for admissibility of
evidence. See supra note 150.

204. Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act of 2000 (ESign) § 101(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7001(a) (West Supp. 2000).
205. Wittie & Wynn, supra note 5, at 331.
206. See supra notes 74-82, 151-152 and accompanying text.

207. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text (discussing the wide adoption of
UETA by the states).
208. N.Y. STATE TEcH. L. 88 101-109 (Consol. 2000).
209. Mark Ustin & J. Kemp Hannon, The New Electronic Signatures and Records

Act, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 26,1999, at 5. In enacting ESRA, the New York legislature chose
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attempt by the New York legislature to balance the differences
found in electronic signature and record bills in other states. 211 The
New York Legislature recognized that, in order to achieve this
balance, the legislation needed to be broad in scope,211 enunciate
clear standards, 12 be flexible,"' be reflective,21 4 and protect
individuals. 5
B.

Preemption of ESRA

Since ESRA is not a uniform enactment of UETA, the ESign consistency test must be used.216 One of the main conflicts
between E-Sign and ESRA is the amount of freedom given to the
2 17
parties to determine the technologies used in a transaction.
not to use the UETA model in creating New York's electronic record and signature
laws. See generally N.Y. STATE TECH. L. §§ 101-109.
210. Ustin & Hannon, supra note 209, at 5. There are three major goals of the
Act: 1) to instill confidence in the public that electronic signatures and records will be
given the same status as paper ones; 2) to create a legislative foundation for fair
information technology regulation; and 3) to avoid unintended consequences from
such legislation. Id.
211. Id. The legislation applies to both the public and private sectors as opposed
to some state laws that only apply to government entities. Id. Of course with the
passage of E-Sign, such limited scope statutes would be preempted for being
inconsistent with the provisions of E-Sign. See supra notes 64-82 and accompanying
text.
212. Ustin & Hannon, supra note 209, at 5. The ESRA seeks to avoid setting out
too minimalist a statute that only authorizes electronic signatures and records with
little guidance beyond that. Id. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE TECH. L. § 102(2).
213. Ustin & Hannon, supra note 209, at 5. The statute attempts to be technologyneutral by not specifying particular technologies that can be used. See generally N.Y.
STATE TECH. L. §§ 101-109. However, the definition of "electronic signature"
appears to be implicitly exclusive of certain methods of electronic signatures that
would be allowed by other electronic signature statutes. Compare Electronic
Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act of 2000 (E-Sign) § 106(5), 15
U.S.C.A. § 7006(5) (West Supp. 2000), with N.Y. STATE TECH. L. § 102(2). Sections
103 and 104 of ESRA place authority in an "electronic facilitator," the Governor's
Office for Technology, to regulate specific issues in relation to ESRA, allowing more
responsiveness to external changes that would impact ESRA and its application.
N.Y. STATE TECH. L. §§ 103-104; Ustin & Hannon, supra note 209, at 5. See also
infra notes 231-241 and accompanying text.
214. Ustin & Hannon, supra note 209, at 5. ESRA requires the Governor's office
for Technology to conduct two follow up reports to be given to the legislature and
governor. Id.
215. Id. ESRA does not require individuals to use an electronic signature, unless
otherwise required by law. N.Y. STATE TECH. L. § 109.
216. See E-Sign § 102(a)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7002(a)(2).
217. Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, The Impact of the New FederalE-Sign Act
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Under ESRA, an "electronic signature" is:
An electronic identifier, including without limitation
a digital signature, which is unique to the person
using it, capable of verification, under the sole
control of the person using it, attached to or
associated with data in such a manner that
authenticates the attachment of the signature to
particular data and the integrity of such data
transmitted, and intended by the party using it to
have the same force and effect as the use of a
signature affixed by hand.218
This approach is a much higher standard than that
promulgated by E-Sign.1 9 The standard set by ESRA addresses
the specific concerns that electronic documents are more difficult
to verify than standard paper based documents in several aspects:
1) whether the document was intended to be authorized; 2)
whether the individual is actually the party that made the
agreement; and 3) whether the contract has been altered in some
way.
Whereas, "lowest-common-denominator""' approach
taken by E-Sign leaves the worry over these concerns to the
individuals and entities employing electronic records and
signatures.'
The impact of E-Sign on the more stringent
requirements of ESRA will be to simplify and reduce the costs of
executing online contracts in New York if the parties choose to
on New York Law, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 8,2000, at 3.
218. N.Y. STATE TECH. L. § 102(3).
219. See Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act of 2000 (ESign) § 106(5), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7006(5) (West Supp. 2000) ("An electronic sound,
symbol, or process, attached to or logically associated with a contract or other record
and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record.").
220. Raysman & Brown, supra note 217, at 3.
221. Id. This approach allows a simple typed initial to be valid as an electronic
signature, but also permits something as technologically advanced as biometricencryption combinations. Id.
222. Id. While reducing security requirements in general, the parties involved in
the transaction are not likely to use a technology that is not secure enough for their
taste. Id The lack of technological requirements opens the door to individuals who
do not desire or could not afford to implement one of the more secure technologies
associated with electronic signatures and transactions. See id.
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take advantage of the leeway granted by the legislation.m
Another area that may be subject to preemption is the
section on consumer protection. ' However, E-Sign provides that
it will not preempt the consumer protection laws of the states; in a
sense, E-Sign works to supplement the consumer protection laws
in New York and other states.' Both E-Sign and ESRA make the
use of electronic signatures and records a voluntary decision, but
E-Sign creates consent requirements to be applied if a party
chooses to use electronic signatures or records. Both E-Sign and
ESRA exclude certain types of documents from the general rule
The
allowing documents to be recorded electronically.'
exclusions E-Sign and ESRA share are limited to contracts
relating to wills, codicils, testamentary trusts, and recordable
E-Sign lays out a host of other
conveyances, such as deeds.'
exemptions from the general rule beyond those named in ESRA,
such as family law documents and court orders, notices, and
official documents.' With the passage of E-Sign, these additional
223. Id. at 6. The preemption of the minimum requirements set out by ESRA
should make it less costly for banks, insurance companies, and securities firms to
conduct online transactions. Id. Under the ESRA scheme, consumers might be
excluded from the electronic market altogether if they do not have sufficient
technology to meet the requirements. See id. The reduced technological
requirements increase access to electronic transactions, while still permitting
individuals to use the highly secure technology if they so desire. See id.
224. N.Y. STATE TECH. L. §§ 105, 107-109. See also Raysman & Brown, supra
note 217, at 6.
225. See Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act of 2000 (ESign) § 101(b)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 101(b)(1) (West Supp. 2000).
This title does not limit, alter, or otherwise affect any requirement
imposed by statute, regulation, or rule of law relating to the rights
and obligations of persons under such statute, regulation, or rule of
law other than a requirement that contracts or other records be
written, signed, or in other nonelectronic form.
Id. This leaves for example, statutes governing fraud or unfair and deceptive trade
practices intact in New York or any other state with such laws. Raysman & Brown,
supra note 217, at 6.
226. Raysman & Brown, supra note 217, at 6. See also supra notes 56-63 and
accompanying text.
227. E-Sign § 103,15 U.S.C.A. § 7003; N.Y. STATE TECH. L. § 107.
228. Raysman & Brown, supra note 217, at 6.
229. E-Sign § 103(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7003(b). These exemptions include notices of
termination of utility service, health insurance, or life insurance; notices of recall;
notices involving credit or rental agreements for a primary residence; and documents
required to accompany hazardous materials during their transportation. Id. See also
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consumer protections now become consumer protections in the
state of New York.'
C.

The Electronic Facilitator

In order to better facilitate the implementation of ESRA,
the Act authorizes the state Office for Technology (OFT) to be the
electronic facilitator and to administer the Act."l The ESRA
authorizes the OFT to promulgate any rule necessary for its timely
implementation. 2 In order to meet the goals set out by ESRA,
the OFT enacted emergency rules? 3 to ensure that the
implementation of ESRA would go as smoothly as possible.'
The emergency rules enacted by the OFT were designed to
establish standards and procedures governing electronic signatures
and records. 5 The emergency rules fulfill this function by setting
out definitions beyond those originally incorporated in ESRA.s
In addition to these definitions, the rules set out the standards for
recognition of an electronic signature under ESRA."7 However,
supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
230. E-Sign § 102(a)(2)(A)(i), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7002(a)(2)(A)(i).
231. N.Y. STATE TECH. L. § 103; see also supra note 213 (defining "Electronic
Facilitator").
232. Emergency Rule Making: Electronic Signatures and Records in New York
State, 15 N.Y. St. Reg. 24, 24 (Office Tech. Mar. 2000) [hereinafter March
Emergency Rule].
233. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & PEGS. tit. 9, § 540 (2000).
234. March Emergency Rule, supra note 232, at 24. The emergency rule
enactment bypassed the normal notice of proposed rulemaking requirements of the
State Administrative Procedure Act, because its immediate enactment was
imperative for ESRA's benefits to be realized. Id. However, public input was
received at every stage of the drafting process of the emergency rule and the public
will have further opportunity to shape the rules, because a notice of proposed
rulemaking will be submitted for formal adoption of a rule during the effective period
of the emergency rule. Id.
235. N.Y. CoMP. CODES R. & EGS. tit. 9, § 540.1(A). The rules are designed to
instill confidence in the use of electronic records and signatures. N.Y. COMP. CODES
R. & PEGS. tit. 9, § 540.1(B). Flexibility is also built into the rules by permitting the
use of any technologies that could be authorized by any other federal or state
electronic record and signature act. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & PEGS. tit. 9, § 540.1(C).
236. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & PEGS. tit. 9, § 540.2. The rules define "certificate,"
"certificate authority," "data," "electronic signatory," "government entity," "material
change," and "person." Id.
237. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & EGS. tit. 9, § 540.4. The rule expands the
definitions of "electronic signatures" and "electronic records" in ESRA into a
statutory form for further clarification. Compare N.Y. CoM. CODES R. & PEGS. tit.
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these rules do not alleviate the dangers of preemption by E-Sign
presented by the original enactment of ESRA.' 8 Despite these
possible preemption problems, and the power of the OFT to
amend the rules to better facilitate the implementation of ESRA,
the emergency rules originally enacted on March 28, 2 000"3 have
been readopted, as originally set forth, after the passage of ESign.' 4 The OFT intends to adopt the provisions of the emergency
rule as permanent rules on December 1, 2000, making it less likely
that ESRA will be able to escape the preemption effects of E-Sign
by modifying its terms through amendments by the OFT. 4
VII. THE FtTURE
Will E-Sign promote uniformity among the states?' Thus
far, at least twenty-three states have passed the UETA in some
form and at least ten other states are considering passing UETA.24
Since the passage of E-Sign, Delaware, Hawaii, Michigan, North
Carolina, and Rhode Island have passed versions of UETA.2 " In
addition, the California legislature is considering a bill that would
modify its current version of UETA and bring it more in line with
the NCCUSL adopted UETA.24 Although none of the versions of
UETA passed by or under the consideration of state legislatures
since the enactment of E-Sign are strict uniform enactments of the
NCCUSL-adopted UETA, the differences do not mean that E-

9, § 540.4, with N.Y. STATE TECH. L. § 102 (Consol. 2000).
238. See supra notes 216-230 and accompanying text.
239. March Emergency Rule, supra note 232, at 24.
240. See Emergency Rule Making: Electronic Signatures and Records in New

York State, 42 N.Y. St. Reg. 19, 19 (Office Tech. Oct. 2000) [hereinafter October
Emergency Rule].

The OFT readopted the emergency rules on October 3, 2000,

several months after the passage of E-Sign. Id.
241. Id. at 21.
242. See 146 CONG. REC. S5223 (daily ed. June 15, 2000) (statement of Sen.
Abraham).
243. See supra note 96.
Ten states are considering UETA:
Arkansas,
Connecticut, Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Oregon, Texas, and Vermont. Kunze, supra note 96.
244. Baker & McKenzie, Global E-Commerce Law: Uniform Electronic
Transactions Act (UETA) State-by-State Comparison Table, at http://www.bmck.
com/ecommerce/uetacomp.htm (last modified Feb. 22,2001).
245. S. 97 (Ca. 2001). See also supra notes 188-190 and accompanying text.
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Sign is failing to promote uniformity.246 In fact, Michigan's version
of UETA is almost identical to the NCCUSL's version of UETA;247
the version currently under consideration by the legislature in New
Jersey is almost identical to the uniform version.24 In addition,
many of the versions of UETA adopted or currently under
consideration differ only slightly from the uniform UETA.249
While, as this Note has indicated, it is important to understand
how E-Sign could interact with non-uniform enactments of UETA,
the enactment of UETA in so many jurisdictions indicates that the
first steps are being taken towards uniformity between the states 5
Throughout Congress' endeavors to achieve the goal of
uniformity across the states, preservation of state sovereignty
looms in the background."5 Though contract law has traditionally
been state law, the pressing need for a standard across the states
resulted in action by the federal government. 2 Congress viewed
allowing the states to adopt their own electronic signature and
records acts, within certain restrictions, as an adequate protection
of state sovereignty.53 Although the federal legislation has been
Baker & McKenzie, supra note 244.
Id.
Id.
David E. Brown, Jr., State Variations in the Uniform Electronic Transactions
Act, 5 ELECTRONIC BANKING L. & COM. REP. 1, 3 (2000). Idaho, Kentucky,
246.
247.
248.
249.

Minnesota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and South Dakota have adopted versions of
UETA that are nearly identical to the version adopted by the NCCUSL. Id.
250. See supra notes 64-82 and accompanying text (discussing preemption
provision of E-Sign).
251. State Sovereignty in Question as Congress Moves on Federal E-Signature
Legislation,ELECTRONIC COM. NEWS, Jan. 10, 2000,2000 WL 4447869.
252. 146 CONG. REc. S5223 (daily ed. June 15,2000) (statement of Sen. Abraham)

("It will likely take three to four years for all the states to enact the UETA."). "That
is a long time in the high-technology sector-far too long to permit, when this
Congress possesses the ability to bridge the gap." Id. The numbers related to
internet revenue and sales also indicate a need for immediate action. See 146 CONG.
REC. H4359 (daily ed. June 14, 2000) (statement of Rep. Davis) (stating that revenue
generated from the internet increased sixty-two percent in 1999, totaling $524
billion). According to Forrester Research, consumer spending on the internet could
reach $185 billion by 2003. 146 CONG. REc. S5217 (daily ed. June 15, 2000)
(statement of Sen. McCain) (emphasis added).

253. 146 CONG. REc. S5224 (daily ed. June 15, 2000) (statement of Sen.
Abraham). The protection of state sovereignty was a crucial issue for many of the
legislators during the legislative process:

In the field of commercial law, the states had a similar experience
with the UCC. Thus, I saw no reason to prevent the states from
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characterized as a gap filler until the states can uniformly step in
with their own laws, it is not clear whether such an argument will
appease pundits of state sovereignty.'
VIII. CONCLUSION

With the emergence of the Internet and e-commerce, the
way many people conduct transactions has moved from primarily
face-to-face to a larger proportion of electronic transactions.' 5 In
order to provide assurances to members of this new economy,
there must be a legal framework that recognizes the electronic
transactions taking place all over the country and the world. 6
While many jurisdictions have attempted to address this need, the
results often vary from one state to the next.57 In the borderless
world of the Internet, the need for uniformity of law is one of the
prime considerations that prompted both the NCCUSL and
Congress to begin working on laws that would promote the
necessary uniformity. "
The UETA, while seen by many as the way to achieve a
national framework for recognition of electronic signatures and
records, will take some time to implement.' 9 Congress enacted ESign as a gap filler in order to provide uniformity and certainty
while UETA makes its way through the states.' The federal law
adhering to the same process with respect to digital signatures. I

made it clear to Senator Abraham that I would not support the
bill-in fact, that I would seek to block its passage-if the
legislation did not preserve the autonomy of the states to adopt the

model law that they were considering. I also sought to make sure
states were able to adopt the model law in a manner consistent
with their consumer protection laws.
146 CONG. REc. S5227 (daily ed. June 15, 2000) (statement of Sen. Hollings); See also

supra notes 64-73 and accompanying text.
254. See 146 CONG. Ruc. S5224 (daily ed. June 15, 2000) (statement of Sen.
Abraham); 146 CONG. REc. H4359 (daily ed. June 14, 2000) (statement of Rep.
Moran).

255. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 24,252 and accompanying text.

257. See, e.g., supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
258. Sen. Spencer Abraham, What features of an e-sign bill will most effectively
impact on e-commerce?, ROLL CALL, Mar 27, 2000. See also supra note 72 and
accompanying text.
259. Wittie & Wynn, supra note 5, at 325.
260. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
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sets a standard across all fifty states when dealing with electronic
records and signatures in interstate commerce." 1 However, if the
state laws already in place come into play, E-Sign could initially
cause uncertainty and confusion, not the uniformity and reliability
E-Sign was intended to foster. 2
There are several different effects the preemption
provisions of E-Sign could have on state electronic record and
signature laws.' Unless the state law is a uniform enactment of
UETA, the consistency test of section 102(a)(2) of E-Sign must be
applied to the state law.' While the possible effects in each state
can be hypothesized, the exact results cannot be predicted with
certainty until a court or administrative agency makes
determinations of the preemption effect. 65 Until the uniformity ESign intended to create is actually reached, insecurity and
confusion will likely frustrate the goals of electronic signature
laws.'
ADAM R. SMART

261. Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act of 2000 (ESign) § 101(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7001(a) (West Supp. 2000). See also supra notes 36-43,
72 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 99-241 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 64-82 and accompanying text.
264. E-Sign § 102(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7002(a).
265. See supra notes 99-241 and accompanying text.
266. See id.

